We propose a model suggesting that honest-but-rational consensus participants may play timing games, and strategically delay their block proposal to optimize MEV capture, while still ensuring the proposal's timely inclusion in the canonical chain. In this context, ensuring economic fairness among consensus participants is critical to preserving decentralization. We contend that a model grounded in honest-but-rational consensus participation provides a more accurate portrayal of behavior in economically incentivized systems such as blockchain protocols. We empirically investigate timing games on the Ethereum network and demonstrate that while timing games are worth playing, they are not currently being exploited by consensus participants. By quantifying the marginal value of time, we uncover strong evidence pointing towards their future potential, despite the limited exploitation of MEV capture observed at present.

翻译：我们提出一个模型，表明诚实但理性的共识参与者可能进行时间游戏，并策略性地延迟其区块提议以优化MEV捕获，同时确保该提议及时纳入规范链。在此背景下，确保共识参与者之间的经济公平性对于维护去中心化至关重要。我们认为，基于诚实但理性共识参与的模型能更准确地描述区块链协议等经济激励系统中的行为。我们实证研究了以太坊网络上的时间游戏，并证明尽管时间游戏值得参与，但目前并未被共识参与者利用。通过量化时间的边际价值，我们发现了强有力的证据指向其未来潜力，尽管当前观察到的MEV捕获利用有限。