We study multi-product monopoly pricing where the seller jointly designs the selling mechanism and the information structure for the buyer to learn his values. Unlike the case with exogenous information, we show that when the seller controls information, even uniform pricing guarantees at least half of the optimal revenue. Moreover, for negatively affiliated or exchangeable value distributions, deterministic pricing is revenue-optimal. Our results highlight the power of information design in making pricing mechanisms approximately optimal in multi-dimensional settings.

翻译：本研究探讨多产品垄断定价问题，其中卖方联合设计销售机制与买方了解自身价值的信息结构。与外生信息情形不同，我们证明当卖方控制信息时，即使采用统一定价也能保证至少获得最优收益的一半。此外，对于负关联或可交换的价值分布，确定性定价可实现收益最优。我们的研究结果凸显了信息设计在多维场景下使定价机制近似最优化的核心作用。