Abstract Like electoral systems, decision-making methods are also vulnerable to manipulation by decision-makers. The ability to effectively defend against such threats can only come from thoroughly understanding the manipulation mechanisms. In the presented article, we show two algorithms that can be used to launch a manipulation attack. They allow for equating the weights of two selected alternatives in the pairwise comparison method and, consequently, choosing a leader. The theoretical considerations are accompanied by a Monte Carlo simulation showing the relationship between the size of the PC matrix, the degree of inconsistency, and the ease of manipulation. This work is a continuation of our previous research published in the paper (Szybowski et al., 2023)

翻译：摘要：与选举制度类似，决策方法也容易受到决策者的操纵。有效抵御此类威胁的能力只能源于对操纵机制的透彻理解。本文展示了两种可用于发起操纵攻击的算法。它们允许在成对比较方法中使两个选定备选方案的权重相等，从而选择出领导者。理论分析辅以蒙特卡洛模拟，揭示了成对比较矩阵的大小、不一致程度与操纵难易程度之间的关系。本研究是我们先前发表在论文（Szybowski 等，2023）中的工作的延续。