We are often faced with the non-trivial task of designing incentive mechanisms in the era of Web3. As history has shown, many Web3 services failed mostly due to the lack of a rigorous incentive mechanism design based on token economics. However, traditional mechanism design, where there is an assumption that the users of services strategically make decisions so that their expected profits are maximized, often does not capture their real behavior well as it ignores humans' psychological bias in making decisions under uncertainty. In this paper, we propose an incentive mechanism design for crypto-enabled services using behavioral economics. Specifically, we take an example of a crypto lottery game in this work and incorporate a seminal work of cumulative prospect theory into its lottery game mechanism (or rule) design. We designed four mechanisms and compared them in terms of utility, a metric of how appealing a mechanism is to participants, and a game operator's expected profit. Our approach is generic and will be applicable to a wide range of crypto-based services where a decision has to be made under uncertainty.

翻译：在Web3时代，我们常常面临设计激励机制的艰巨任务。历史表明，许多Web3服务失败的主要原因在于缺乏基于代币经济学的严谨激励机制设计。然而，传统机制设计假设服务用户会策略性地做出决策以最大化其预期收益，这种设计往往无法准确反映用户真实行为，因为它忽略了人类在不确定性决策中的心理偏差。本文提出一种利用行为经济学为加密货币赋能服务设计激励机制的方法。具体而言，我们以加密货币彩票游戏为例，将累积前景理论这一开创性成果融入其彩票游戏机制（或规则）设计中。我们设计了四种机制，并从效用（衡量机制对参与者吸引力的指标）和游戏运营商的预期收益两个维度进行比较。该方法具有通用性，适用于各类需要在不确定性条件下做出决策的加密货币基础服务。