We consider a class of pursuit-evasion differential games in which the evader has continuous access to the pursuer's location, but not vice-versa. There is a remote sensor (e.g., a radar station) that can sense the evader's location upon a request from the pursuer and communicate that sensed location to the pursuer. The pursuer has a budget on the total number of sensing requests. The outcome of the game is determined by the sensing and motion strategies of the players. We obtain an equilibrium sensing strategy for the pursuer and an equilibrium motion strategy for the evader. We quantify the degradation in the pursuer's pay-off due to its sensing limitations.

翻译：我们研究了一类追逃微分博弈问题，其中逃逸者能持续获取追捕者的位置信息，但反之不成立。系统配备远程传感器（如雷达站），可在追捕者请求时感知逃逸者位置并将其传输给追捕者。追捕者拥有总感知请求次数的预算约束。博弈结果由双方的感知策略与运动策略共同决定。我们求得了追捕者的均衡感知策略与逃逸者的均衡运动策略，并量化了因感知能力受限导致的追捕者收益损失。