As quantum computing advances, the cryptographic algorithms that underpin confidentiality, integrity, and authentication in Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) face increasing vulnerability to quantum-enabled attacks. To address these risks, governments and industry stakeholders are turning toward post-quantum cryptography (PQC), a class of algorithms designed to resist adversaries equipped with quantum computing capabilities. However, existing studies provide limited insight into the implementation-focused aspects of PQC in the ITS domain. This review addresses that gap by evaluating the readiness of vehicular communication and security standards for adopting PQC. It examines in-vehicle networks and vehicle-to-everything (V2X) interfaces, and investigates vulnerabilities at the physical implementation layer of cryptographic hardware and embedded platforms, primarily exposure to side-channel and fault injection attacks. The review identifies thirteen research gaps: non-PQC-ready standards; constraints in embedded implementation and hybrid cryptography; interoperability and certificate-management barriers; a lack of real-world PQC deployment data in ITS; and physical-attack vulnerabilities in PQC-enabled vehicular communication. We present several future research directions, including updating vehicular communication and security standards, optimizing PQC for low-power devices, enhancing interoperability and certificate-management frameworks for PQC integration, conducting real-world evaluations of PQC-enabled communication and control functions across ITS deployments, and strengthening defenses against AI-assisted physical attacks. A phased roadmap is presented that aligns PQC deployment with regulatory, performance, and safety requirements, thereby guiding the secure evolution of ITS in the quantum computing era.

翻译：随着量子计算的发展，支撑智能交通系统（ITS）中机密性、完整性与认证的密码算法面临日益增长的量子攻击威胁。为应对这些风险，各国政府与行业相关方正转向后量子密码学（PQC）——一类旨在抵御具备量子计算能力的攻击者的算法体系。然而，现有研究对PQC在ITS领域中面向实现层面的探讨仍显不足。本综述通过评估车载通信与安全标准对PQC的接纳准备度来填补这一空白。文章系统考察了车内网络与车联万物（V2X）接口，并深入探究了密码硬件与嵌入式平台在物理实现层的脆弱性，主要涉及侧信道攻击与故障注入攻击的暴露风险。本综述识别出十三个研究缺口：标准体系未适配PQC；嵌入式实现与混合密码技术的约束；互操作性及证书管理壁垒；ITS领域缺乏真实的PQC部署数据；以及支持PQC的车载通信系统面临的物理攻击脆弱性。我们提出了若干未来研究方向，包括：更新车载通信与安全标准；面向低功耗设备优化PQC算法；完善PQC集成的互操作性及证书管理框架；在ITS实际部署中对支持PQC的通信与控制功能开展实地评估；以及强化针对人工智能辅助物理攻击的防御能力。本文进一步提出了分阶段实施路线图，使PQC部署与监管要求、性能指标及安全需求相协调，从而为量子计算时代ITS的安全演进提供指引。