This paper addresses the challenge of achieving information-theoretic security in semantic communication (SeCom) over a wiretap channel, where a legitimate receiver coexists with an eavesdropper experiencing a poorer channel condition. Despite previous efforts to secure SeCom against eavesdroppers, achieving information-theoretic security in such schemes remains an open issue. In this work, we propose a secure digital SeCom approach based on superposition codes, aiming to attain nearly information-theoretic security. Our proposed method involves associating semantic information with satellite constellation points within a double-layered constellation map, where cloud center constellation points are randomly selected. By carefully allocating power between these two layers of constellation, we ensure that the symbol error probability (SEP) of the eavesdropper decoding satellite constellation points is nearly equivalent to random guessing, while maintaining a low SEP for the legitimate receiver to successfully decode the semantic information. Simulation results showcase that the Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR) and Mean Squared Error (MSE) for the eavesdropper's reconstructed data, using our proposed method, can range from decoding Gaussian-distributed random noise to approaching the variance of the data. This validates the ability of our method to achieve nearly information-theoretic security, demonstrating superior data security compared to benchmark methods.

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