No deployed automated market maker lets its liquidity providers vote on the trading function. We show this is structural, not an oversight. On the weighted-product family with $n \geq 3$ assets, no aggregation rule is at once fair and strategy-proof. Arrovian fairness forces a unique form, the weighted Aitchison centroid, the weighted geometric mean of the providers' preferred pools. But fairness forces mean-type aggregation and strategy-proofness forces median-type, and the only rule that is both is a single-provider dictator. The obstruction is sharp: it vanishes at $n = 2$, where a fair strategy-proof rule exists. Under the Frongillo--Papireddygari--Waggoner equivalence, the centroid is Genest's logarithmic opinion pool, and the impossibility transfers to externally Bayesian pooling.

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