We study mechanism design with predictions for the obnoxious facility location problem. We present deterministic strategyproof mechanisms that display tradeoffs between robustness and consistency on segments, squares, circles and trees. All these mechanisms are actually group strategyproof, with the exception of the case of squares, where manipulations from coalitions of two agents exist. We prove that these tradeoffs are optimal in the 1-dimensional case.

翻译：我们研究机制设计,预测设施位置问题;我们提出确定性战略防患于未然的机制,显示各区、广场、圆圈和树木的稳健性和一致性之间的平衡;所有这些机制实际上都是集体战略防患于未然的,但广场除外,那里存在两个代理人联盟的操纵。我们证明,在一维情况下,这些平衡是最佳的。