We study a budget-aggregation setting in which a number of voters report their ideal distribution of a budget over a set of alternatives, and a mechanism aggregates these reports into an allocation. Ideally, such mechanisms are truthful, i.e., voters should not be incentivized to misreport their preferences. For the case of two alternatives, the set of mechanisms that are truthful and additionally meet a range of basic desiderata (anonymity, neutrality, and continuity) exactly coincides with the so-called moving-phantom mechanisms, but whether this space is richer for more alternatives was repeatedly stated as an open question. We answer this question in the affirmative by presenting a new mechanism that is not a moving-phantom mechanism but satisfies the four properties. Since moving-phantom mechanisms can only provide limited fairness guarantees (measured as the worst-case distance to a fair share solution), one motivation for broadening the class of truthful mechanisms is the hope for improved fairness guarantees. We dispel this hope by showing that lower bounds holding for the class of moving-phantom mechanisms extend to all truthful, anonymous, neutral, and continuous mechanisms.
翻译:我们研究一种预算聚合场景,其中若干投票者报告其在一组备选方案上理想的预算分配方案,而机制将这些报告聚合成一个最终分配。理想情况下,此类机制应具有真实性,即投票者不应有动机虚报其偏好。对于两种备选方案的情形,满足真实性及一系列基本要求(匿名性、中立性与连续性)的机制集合恰好对应于所谓的移动幻影机制,但对于更多备选方案时该空间是否更丰富,一直被视为开放性问题。我们通过提出一种新型机制对此问题给出肯定回答,该机制并非移动幻影机制但满足上述四个性质。由于移动幻影机制仅能提供有限的公平性保证(以最坏情况下与公平分配解的差距衡量),拓展真实机制类别的动机之一在于期望获得更好的公平性保证。我们通过证明适用于移动幻影机制类的下界可扩展至所有真实、匿名、中立且连续的机制,从而否定了这一期望。