A principal hires an agent to work on a long-term project that culminates in a breakthrough or a breakdown. At each time, the agent privately chooses to work or shirk. Working increases the arrival rate of breakthroughs and decreases the arrival rate of breakdowns. To motivate the agent to work, the principal conducts costly inspections. She fires the agent if shirking is detected. We characterize the principal's optimal inspection policy. Periodic inspections are optimal if work primarily speeds up breakthroughs. Random inspections are optimal if work primarily delays breakdowns. Crucially, the agent's actions determine his risk-attitude over the timing of punishments.

翻译：一位委托人雇佣代理人从事一项长期项目，该项目最终可能取得突破或失败。在每个时刻，代理人私下选择努力或偷懒。努力会增加突破的到达率，同时减少失败的到达率。为激励代理人努力工作，委托人进行成本高昂的检查。若发现代理人偷懒，则将其解雇。我们刻画了委托人的最优检查策略。当努力主要加速突破时，定期检查是最优的；当努力主要延迟失败时，随机检查是最优的。关键在于，代理人的行为决定了他对惩罚时机风险态度的偏好。