In mechanism design, the facility location game is an extensively studied problem. In the classical model, the cost of each agent is her distance to the nearest facility. In this paper, we consider a new model, where there is a location-dependent entrance fee to the facility. Thus, in our model, the cost of each agent is the sum of the distance to the facility and the entrance fee of the facility. This is a refined generalization of the classical model. We study the model and design strategyproof mechanisms. For one and two facilities, we provide upper and lower bounds for the approximation ratio given by deterministic and randomized mechanisms, with respect to the utilitarian objective and the egalitarian objective. Most of our bounds are tight and these bounds are independent of the entrance fee functions. Our results are as general as possible because the entrance fee function we consider is arbitrary.

翻译：在机制设计中,设施定位游戏是一个广泛研究的问题。在古典模型中,每个代理商的成本是她与最近的设施之间的距离。在本文中,我们考虑一种新的模型,即设施有取决于地点的入口费。因此,在我们的模型中,每个代理商的成本是设施距离和设施入口费的总和。这是对古典模型的精细概括。我们研究模型和设计战略防护机制。对于一个和两个设施,我们提供确定性和随机化机制提供的近似比率的上限和下限,涉及非专利性目标和平等目标。我们的大部分界限很紧,这些界限与入口费功能无关。我们的结果尽可能笼统,因为我们认为进口费功能是任意的。