Software-based microarchitectural attacks have mainly exploited timing differences to infer information from DRAM. However, defenses and optimizations can prevent timing-based approaches from resolving precise microarchitectural behaviors. We show that unprivileged millisecond- and milliampere-resolution power sensors on modern Arm SoCs can recover DRAM mapping functions and reveal the data dependence of memory accesses without timers. We present HOMARD, a methodology that reads DRAM activity from this telemetry, and two attack primitives. HOMARD-RE is a hierarchy-aware linear-algebraic method that reverse-engineers DRAM addressing functions from power alone. HOMARD-DATA recovers the Hamming weight of a fetched cache line through joint-power rail templating and secret byte values through correlation power analysis on the same rails. Across an AMD ZCU102, a Raspberry Pi 5, and a multi-chip-based LPDDR4 NVIDIA Jetson TX2, HOMARD-RE succeeds where row-buffer timing methods fail. On the Pi 5, HOMARD-DATA classifies 9 Hamming-weight levels at 81.5% accuracy and recovers secret bytes in minutes by correlating rail current with data-dependent bit toggling between neighbors in a row. Both primitives work with an architectural load or a mispredicted Spectre-RSB path on which no value is architecturally read. These results establish unprivileged power telemetry as an independent side channel for profiled microarchitectural attacks, particularly when timing falls silent.

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