We study committee elections from a perspective of finding the most conflicting candidates, that is, candidates that imply the largest amount of conflict, as per voter preferences. By proposing basic axioms to capture this objective, we show that none of the prominent multiwinner voting rules meet them. Consequently, we design committee voting rules compliant with our desiderata, introducing conflictual voting rules. A subsequent deepened analysis sheds more light on how they operate. Our investigation identifies various aspects of conflict, for which we come up with relevant axioms and quantitative measures, which may be of independent interest. We support our theoretical study with experiments on both real-life and synthetic data.

翻译：我们基于选民偏好，从寻找最具冲突性候选人的视角研究委员会选举——即那些引发最大程度冲突的候选人。通过提出捕获这一目标的基本公理，我们证明了现有主流多胜者投票规则均无法满足这些公理。为此，我们设计了符合期望准则的委员会投票规则，提出了冲突性投票规则。后续的深入分析进一步揭示了其运作机制。我们的研究识别了冲突的多个维度，并针对这些维度提出了相关公理与量化指标，这些成果可能具有独立的研究价值。我们通过在真实数据集与合成数据集上的实验为理论研究提供了实证支持。