We develop a model of coordination and allocation of decentralized multi-sided markets, in which our theoretical analysis is promisingly optimizing the decentralized transaction packaging process at high-throughput blockchains or Web 3.0 platforms. In contrast to the stylized centralized platform, the decentralized platform is powered by blockchain technology, which allows for secure and transparent Peer-to-Peer transactions among users. Traditional single-chain-based blockchains suffer from the well-known blockchain trilemma. Beyond the single-chain-based scheme, decentralized high-throughput blockchains adopt parallel protocols to reconcile the blockchain trilemma, implementing any tasking and desired allocation. However, unneglectable network latency may induce partial observability, resulting in incoordination and misallocation issues for the decentralized transaction packaging process at the current high-throughput blockchain protocols. To address this problem, we consider a strategic coordination mechanism for the decentralized transaction packaging process by using a game-theoretic approach. Under a tractable two-period model, we find a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the miner's strategic transaction packaging under partial observability. Along with novel algorithms for computing equilibrium payoffs, we show that the decentralized platform can achieve an efficient and stable market outcome. The model also highlights that the proposed mechanism can endogenously offer a base fee per gas without any restructuration of the initial blockchain transaction fee mechanism. The theoretical results that underlie the algorithms also imply bounds on the computational complexity of equilibrium payoffs.

翻译：我们建立了一个去中心化多边市场的协调与分配模型，其理论分析有望优化高吞吐量区块链或Web 3.0平台上的去中心化交易打包过程。与典型的中心化平台不同，去中心化平台由区块链技术支持，允许用户之间进行安全透明的点对点交易。传统基于单链的区块链面临著名的“区块链不可能三角”问题。超越单链方案，去中心化高吞吐量区块链采用并行协议来调和区块链不可能三角，实现任意任务分配和期望的资源配置。然而，不可忽视的网络延迟可能导致部分可观测性，从而在当前高吞吐量区块链协议的去中心化交易打包过程中引发不协调和错配问题。为解决这一问题，我们采用博弈论方法，提出了一种针对去中心化交易打包过程的策略性协调机制。在一个易于处理的两周期模型下，我们找到了部分可观测性条件下矿工策略性交易打包的贝叶斯纳什均衡。结合计算均衡收益的新型算法，我们证明了去中心化平台能够实现高效且稳定的市场结果。该模型还强调，所提出的机制无需对初始区块链交易费用机制进行重构，即可内生地提供每单位Gas的基础费用。支撑这些算法的理论结果还隐含了均衡收益计算复杂度的界限。