Control of encrypted digital assets is traditionally equated with permanent possession of private keys, a model that precludes regulatory supervision, conditional delegation, and legally compliant transfer at the cryptographic layer. Existing remedies (multi-signature schemes, threshold signatures, smart contracts, custodial delegation) require persistent key exposure, on-chain state mutation, or trusted intermediaries. We introduce Condition-Triggered Dormant Authorization Paths (CT-DAP), a cryptographic asset control method built on destructible authorization factors and parameterized by a root-derivable framework satisfying deterministic key derivation, context-isolated capability generation, and authorization-bound revocation. Under CT-DAP, control rights are dormant authorization paths composed of user-held credentials and administrative factors held by independent custodians; a path remains cryptographically inactive until all factors are simultaneously available. Upon verification of predefined conditions (e.g., user consent, inheritance events, time-based triggers), the corresponding factor is released, activating the path. Revocation is achieved by destroying factors, rendering the path permanently unusable without altering the cryptographic root. We formalize the threat model, define security games for unauthorized control resistance, path isolation, and stateless revocation, and prove security under standard assumptions (AEAD security of AES-GCM-SIV, PRF security of HKDF, memory-hardness of Argon2id, collision resistance of SHA-256). We instantiate CT-DAP using the Atomic Cryptographic Entity Generative Framework (ACE-GF) and evaluate performance, demonstrating sub-second activation latency with configurable security-performance trade-offs.

翻译：传统上，加密数字资产的控制等同于永久持有私钥，这种模式排除了监管监督、条件委托以及在密码学层面实现合法合规的转移。现有解决方案（多签方案、门限签名、智能合约、托管委托）需要持续暴露密钥、链上状态变更或可信中介。我们提出条件触发的休眠授权路径（CT-DAP），这是一种基于可销毁授权因子、并通过满足确定性密钥派生、上下文隔离能力生成和授权绑定撤销的可根派生框架参数化的加密资产控制方法。在CT-DAP下，控制权是由用户持有的凭证和独立托管方持有的管理因子构成的休眠授权路径；在全部因子同时可用之前，路径在密码学上保持非活跃状态。当预定义条件（例如用户同意、继承事件、基于时间的触发器等）通过验证后，相应因子被释放，从而激活路径。撤销通过销毁因子实现，使得路径永久失效，而无需更改密码学根密钥。我们形式化了威胁模型，定义了针对未授权控制抵抗、路径隔离和无状态撤销的安全博弈，并在标准假设下（AES-GCM-SIV的AEAD安全性、HKDF的PRF安全性、Argon2id的内存硬度、SHA-256的抗碰撞性）证明了其安全性。我们使用原子密码实体生成框架（ACE-GF）实例化了CT-DAP，并评估了其性能，展示了亚秒级的激活延迟以及可配置的安全-性能权衡。