Many smart grid frameworks, such as demand response programs, require accurate information about consumers' parameters (e.g., flexibility) at the aggregator side to optimize grid operations. Existing works typically rely on perfect information assumptions or complex incentive-compatible mechanisms; however, in voluntary settings, and in the presence of strategic consumers, possibly implemented by automated intelligent agents, private parameters may be misreported due to strategic incentives. We analyze this communication setting using cheap-talk game theory, delivering four key insights. First, the nontrivial scenario of multiple strategic transmitters (consumers) turns out to be tractable for the case study of interest: we prove that complex strategic interactions among multiple consumers decouple into independent subgames. Second, we demonstrate that a pre-announced retail price can be exploited as a design lever to control the information revealed by the consumers and therefore the overall system efficiency. Third, we derive a closed-form expression for the optimal uniform price that maximizes information revelation. Finally, we characterize the equilibrium structure to identify when communication is informative. Simulations show that a properly designed price for the communication scheme can recover up to 95% of the ideal system utility (i.e., under perfect information reporting), whereas a price-unaware choice leads to significant losses in social welfare.

翻译：许多智能电网框架（如需求响应项目）需要在聚合器侧获取准确的消费者参数（例如灵活性）以优化电网运行。现有研究通常依赖于完美信息假设或复杂的激励相容机制；然而，在自愿参与环境下，面对可能由自动化智能代理实施的策略性消费者，私有参数可能因策略性激励而被误报。我们运用廉价磋商博弈理论分析这一通信场景，得出四个关键结论。首先，针对所关注的案例研究，多个策略性发送者（消费者）的非平凡场景被证明是可处理的：我们证明了多个消费者间的复杂策略相互作用可解耦为独立的子博弈。其次，我们论证了预先公布的零售电价可作为设计杠杆，用以控制消费者揭示的信息，从而影响整体系统效率。第三，我们推导出最大化信息揭示的最优统一定价的闭式表达式。最后，我们刻画均衡结构以确定通信何时具有信息性。仿真表明，为通信方案合理设计的定价可恢复高达95%的理想系统效用（即在完美信息报告条件下），而无价格感知的选择将导致社会福利的显著损失。