Encrypted messaging services like WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, and Signal provide secure and deniable communication for billions across the world, but these exact properties prevent holding users accountable for sending messages that are abusive, misinformative, or otherwise harmful to society. Previous works have addressed this concern by allowing a moderator to verify the identity of a message's sender if a message is reported; if not reported, messages maintain all security guarantees. Using primitives from threshold cryptography, this work extends the message-reporting protocol Hecate from Issa, Alhaddad, and Varia to a setting in which consensus among a group of moderators is required to reveal and verify the identity of a message's sender.

翻译：像WhatsApp、Facebook Messenger和Signal这样的加密消息服务为全球数十亿用户提供了安全且可否认的通信，但这些特性也导致无法追究用户发送辱骂性、虚假信息或其他有害社会消息的责任。以往的研究通过引入审核员机制解决这一问题：当消息被举报时，审核员可以验证发送者的身份；若未被举报，消息则保留所有安全保证。本研究利用门限密码学原语，将Issa、Alhaddad和Varia提出的消息举报协议Hecate扩展至需要一组审核员达成共识才能披露并验证消息发送者身份的设定。