This paper studies multi-object reallocation without monetary transfers, where agents initially own multiple indivisible objects and have strict preferences over bundles (e.g., shift exchange among workers at a firm). Focusing on marginal rules that elicit only rankings over individual objects, we provide axiomatic characterizations of the generalized Top Trading Cycles rule (TTC) on the lexicographic and responsive domains. On the lexicographic domain, TTC is characterized by balancedness, individual-good efficiency, the worst-endowment lower bound, and either truncation-proofness or drop strategy-proofness. On the responsive domain, TTC is the unique marginal rule satisfying individual-good efficiency, truncation-proofness, and either the worst-endowment lower bound or individual rationality. In the Shapley--Scarf housing market, TTC is characterized by Pareto efficiency, individual rationality, and truncation-proofness. Finally, on the conditionally lexicographic domain, the augmented Top Trading Cycles rule is characterized by balancedness, Pareto efficiency, the worst-endowment lower bound, and drop strategy-proofness. The conditionally lexicographic domain is a maximal domain on which Pareto efficiency coincides with individual-good efficiency.

翻译：本文研究无货币转移的多物品再分配问题，其中代理人初始拥有多个不可分割物品，且对物品组合具有严格偏好（例如企业员工的班次交换）。聚焦于仅需获取个体物品排序的边际规则，我们在词典序域和响应式域上对广义顶端交易循环规则（TTC）进行了公理化刻画。在词典序域上，TTC 由平衡性、个体物品效率、最差禀赋下界，以及截断证明性或弃置策略证明性共同刻画。在响应式域上，TTC 是唯一满足个体物品效率、截断证明性，以及最差禀赋下界或个体理性的边际规则。在沙普利-斯卡夫住房市场中，TTC 由帕累托效率、个体理性和截断证明性刻画。最后，在条件词典序域上，增强型顶端交易循环规则由平衡性、帕累托效率、最差禀赋下界和弃置策略证明性刻画。条件词典序域是帕累托效率与个体物品效率相一致的最大域。