Decentralized cryptocurrencies are payment systems that rely on aligning the incentives of users and miners to operate correctly and offer a high quality of service to users. Recent literature studies the mechanism design problem of the auction serving as a cryptocurrency's transaction fee mechanism (TFM). We present a general framework that captures both myopic and non-myopic settings, as well as different possible strategic models for users. Within this general framework, when restricted to the myopic case, we show that while the mechanism that requires a user to "pay-as-bid", and greedily chooses among available transactions based on their fees, is not dominant strategy incentive-compatible for users, it has a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium where bids are slightly shaded. Relaxing this incentive compatibility requirement circumvents the impossibility results proven by previous works, and allows for an approximately revenue and welfare optimal, myopic miner incentive-compatible (MMIC), and off-chain-agreement (OCA)-proof mechanism. We prove these guarantees using different benchmarks, and show that the pay-as-bid greedy auction is the revenue optimal Bayesian incentive-compatible, MMIC and 1-OCA-proof mechanism among a large class of mechanisms. We move beyond the myopic setting explored in the literature, to one where users offer transaction fees for their transaction to be accepted, as well as report their urgency level by specifying the time to live of the transaction, after which it expires. We analyze pay-as-bid mechanisms in this setting, and show the competitive ratio guarantees provided by the greedy allocation rule. We then present a better-performing non-myopic rule, and analyze its competitive ratio. The above analysis is stated in terms of a cryptocurrency TFM, but applies to other settings, such as cloud computing and decentralized "gig" economy, as well.

翻译：去中心化加密货币是支付系统，其正常运行和为用户提供高质量服务依赖于用户与矿工激励的一致性。近期文献研究了作为加密货币交易费用机制的拍卖机制设计问题。我们提出了一个通用框架，同时涵盖短视与非短视设定，以及用户的不同战略模型。在此框架内，若限定于短视情形，我们证明：尽管要求用户"按出价付费"并基于费用贪婪选择可用交易的机制并非用户的占优策略激励兼容，但存在出价略低于真实估值的贝叶斯-纳什均衡。放宽此激励兼容性条件可规避先前工作证明的不可能性结果，并实现近似收入与福利最优、对短视矿工激励兼容（MMIC）且抗链下协议（OCA-proof）的机制。我们采用不同基准证明这些保证，并表明在广泛机制类别中，按出价贪婪拍卖是贝叶斯激励兼容、MMIC且1-OCA-proof的收入最优机制。我们超越文献中探索的短视设定，转向用户为交易被接纳而提供交易费用，同时通过设定交易有效期（过期后失效）报告其紧急程度的情形。我们分析此设定下的按出价机制，并证明贪婪分配规则提供的竞争比保证。随后提出一种性能更优的非短视规则，并分析其竞争比。上述分析以加密货币交易费用机制为背景阐述，但同样适用于云计算和去中心化"零工经济"等其他场景。