We provide an overview of three different query languages whose objective is to specify properties on the highly popular formalisms of fault trees (FTs) and attack trees (ATs). These are BFL, a Boolean Logic for FTs, PFL, a probabilistic extension of BFL and ATM, a logic for security metrics on ATs. We validate the framework composed by these three logics by applying them to the case study of a water distribution network. We extend the FT for this network - found in the literature - and we propose to model the system under analysis with the Fault Trees/Attack Trees (FT/ATs) formalism, combining both FTs and ATs in a unique model. Furthermore, we propose a novel combination of the showcased logics to account for queries that jointly consider both the FT and the AT of the model, integrating influences of attacks on failure probabilities of different components. Finally, we extend the domain specific language for PFL with novel constructs to capture the interplay between metrics of attacks - e.g., "cost", success probabilities - and failure probabilities in the system.

翻译：本文概述了三种不同的查询语言，其目标是在故障树（FT）和攻击树（AT）这两种广受欢迎的规范形式中指定属性。这三种语言分别是：BFL——针对FT的布尔逻辑，PFL——BFL的概率扩展，以及ATM——针对AT安全度量的逻辑。我们通过将其应用于供水分配网络的案例研究来验证由这三种逻辑组成的框架。我们对文献中已有的该网络的FT进行了扩展，并提出使用故障树/攻击树（FT/AT）规范形式对分析系统进行建模，将FT和AT合并到一个统一模型中。此外，我们提出了一种所展示逻辑的新颖组合，以处理联合考虑模型中的FT和AT的查询问题，从而整合攻击对系统不同组件失效概率的影响。最后，我们扩展了PFL的领域特定语言，添加了新颖的构造来捕捉攻击度量（例如“成本”、成功概率）与系统中失效概率之间的相互作用。