Cyber insurance is a complementary mechanism to further reduce the financial impact on the systems after their effort in defending against cyber attacks and implementing resilience mechanism to maintain the system-level operator even though the attacker is already in the system. This chapter presents a review of the quantitative cyber insurance design framework that takes into account the incentives as well as the perceptual aspects of multiple parties. The design framework builds on the correlation between state-of-the-art attacker vectors and defense mechanisms. In particular, we propose the notion of residual risks to characterize the goal of cyber insurance design. By elaborating the insurer's observations necessary for the modeling of the cyber insurance contract, we make comparison between the design strategies of the insurer under scenarios with different monitoring rules. These distinct but practical scenarios give rise to the concept of the intensity of the moral hazard issue. Using the modern techniques in quantifying the risk preferences of individuals, we link the economic impacts of perception manipulation with moral hazard. With the joint design of cyber insurance design and risk perceptions, cyber resilience can be enhanced under mild assumptions on the monitoring of insurees' actions. Finally, we discuss possible extensions on the cyber insurance design framework to more sophisticated settings and the regulations to strengthen the cyber insurance markets.

翻译：网络保险是一种补充机制，旨在在系统努力抵御网络攻击并实施韧性机制以维持系统级运营（即使攻击者已进入系统）后，进一步降低其财务影响。本章回顾了考虑多方激励与感知因素的量化网络保险设计框架。该设计框架基于最新攻击向量与防御机制之间的关联性构建。具体而言，我们提出残余风险的概念来刻画网络保险设计的目标。通过阐述保险人在网络保险合同建模中所需的观测信息，我们对比了不同监控规则场景下保险人的设计策略。这些独特但实用的场景引发了道德风险强度的概念。借助现代量化个体风险偏好的技术，我们将感知操纵的经济影响与道德风险联系起来。通过对网络保险设计与风险感知的联合设计，可以在对投保人行为监控的温和假设下增强网络韧性。最后，我们讨论了网络保险设计框架在更复杂场景中的可能扩展，以及强化网络保险市场的监管措施。