Ride-pooling, to gain momentum, needs to be attractive for all the parties involved. This includes also drivers, who are naturally reluctant to serve pooled rides. This can be controlled by the platform's pricing strategy, which can stimulate drivers to serve pooled rides. Here, we propose an agent-based framework, where drivers serve rides that maximise their utility. We simulate a series of scenarios in Delft and compare three strategies. Our results show that drivers, when they maximize their profits, earn more than in both the solo-rides and only-pooled rides scenarios. This shows that serving pooled rides can be beneficial as well for drivers, yet typically not all pooled rides are attractive for drivers. The proposed framework may be further applied to propose discriminative pricing in which the full potential of ride-pooling is exploited, with benefits for the platform, travellers, and (which is novel here) to the drivers.

翻译：拼车要获得发展势头，需对所有参与方具有吸引力，这包括天生不愿服务拼车订单的司机。平台定价策略可激励司机承接拼车单。本文提出一种基于智能体的框架，司机将服务能最大化自身效益的订单。我们在代尔夫特模拟了一系列场景，比较了三种策略。结果表明，当司机追求利润最大化时，其收入均高于纯独乘或纯拼车场景。这说明服务拼车单对司机同样有利，但通常并非所有拼车单都具有吸引力。该框架可进一步用于提出差异化定价方案，以充分挖掘拼车潜力，为平台、乘客及（本文创新点）司机创造收益。