One justification for preregistering research hypotheses, methods, and analyses is that it improves the transparent evaluation of the severity of hypothesis tests. In this article, I consider two cases in which preregistration does not improve this evaluation. First, I argue that, although preregistration can facilitate the transparent evaluation of severity in Mayo's error statistical philosophy of science, it does not facilitate this evaluation in Popper's theory-centric philosophy. To illustrate, I show that associated concerns about Type I error rate inflation are only relevant in the error statistical approach and not in a theory-centric approach. Second, I argue that a preregistered test procedure that allows deviations in its implementation does not provide a more transparent evaluation of Mayoian severity than a non-preregistered procedure. In particular, I argue that sample-based validity-enhancing deviations cause an unknown inflation of the test procedure's Type I (familywise) error rate and, consequently, an unknown reduction in its capability to license inferences severely. I conclude that preregistration does not improve the transparent evaluation of severity in Popper's philosophy of science or when deviations are allowed.

翻译：预注册研究假设、方法与分析的一种合理性在于，它能提升假设检验严格性透明评估的质量。本文探讨了预注册无法改善此类评估的两种情形。首先，本文论证：虽然预注册能促进梅奥误差统计科学哲学中严格性的透明评估，但在波普尔理论中心科学哲学中却无法实现同等效果。为阐明此观点，本文指出关于Ⅰ类错误率膨胀的相关考量仅适用于误差统计方法，而不适用于理论中心方法。其次，本文论证：允许实施过程中存在偏离的预注册检验程序，相较于非预注册程序，并不能提供更透明的梅奥式严格性评估。特别需要指出的是，基于样本的有效性增强偏离会导致检验程序的Ⅰ类（族系）错误率发生未知膨胀，进而造成其推理严格性认证能力的不可知衰减。最终结论表明：在波普尔科学哲学框架下或允许实施偏离的情况下，预注册均无法提升严格性透明评估的效能。