We prove that there is no preferential voting method satisfying the Condorcet winner and loser criteria, positive involvement (if a candidate $x$ wins in an initial preference profile, then adding a voter who ranks $x$ uniquely first cannot cause $x$ to lose), and $n$-voter resolvability (if $x$ initially ties for winning, then $x$ can be made the unique winner by adding some set of up to $n$ voters). This impossibility theorem holds for any positive integer $n$. In a previous note, we proved an analogous result assuming an additional axiom of ordinal margin invariance, which we now show is unnecessary for an impossibility theorem, at least if the desired voting method is defined for five-candidate elections.

翻译：我们证明不存在满足孔多塞胜者准则、孔多塞败者准则、积极介入性（若候选人 $x$ 在初始偏好剖面中获胜，则增加一位将 $x$ 唯一排在首位的投票者不会导致 $x$ 落败）以及 $n$ 投票者可解性（若 $x$ 初始与其他候选人并列获胜，则可通过增加至多 $n$ 位投票者使 $x$ 成为唯一胜者）的优先投票方法。该不可能性定理对任意正整数 $n$ 均成立。在先前的笔记中，我们在附加序数边际不变性公理的前提下证明了类似结论；本文则表明，对于不可能性定理而言（至少在五候选人选举中定义的投票方法范围内），该附加公理并非必要条件。