Man-made and natural disruptions such as planned constructions on roads, suspensions of bridges, and blocked roads by trees/mudslides/floods can often create obstacles that separate two connected regions. As a result, the traveling and reachability of agents from their respective regions to other regions can be affected. To minimize the impact of the obstacles and maintain agent accessibility, we initiate the problem of constructing a new pathway (e.g., a detour or new bridge) connecting the regions disconnected by obstacles from the mechanism design perspective. In the problem, each agent in their region has a private location and is required to access the other region. The cost of an agent is the distance from their location to the other region via the pathway. Our goal is to design strategyproof mechanisms that elicit truthful locations from the agents and approximately optimize the social or maximum cost of agents by determining locations in the regions for building a pathway. We provide a characterization of all strategyproof and anonymous mechanisms. For the social and maximum costs, we provide upper and lower bounds on the approximation ratios of strategyproof mechanisms.

翻译：人为及自然中断事件（如道路施工、桥梁暂停通行、树木/泥石流/洪水导致的路段阻塞）常会形成障碍，使原本连通的两个区域分离，进而影响区域内主体前往其他区域的通行与可达性。为降低障碍影响并保障主体的可达性，我们从机制设计角度提出构建新路径（例如迂回道路或新桥梁），以连接被障碍隔开的区域。在该问题中，每个区域内主体拥有私有位置且需前往另一区域，其成本为经路径从自身位置到达另一区域的距离。我们的目标是通过在区域内确定路径建造位置，设计能够引导主体如实报告位置且近似优化社会总成本或最大成本的策略证明机制。本文对所有策略证明与匿名机制进行了刻画，并针对社会总成本与最大成本给出了策略证明机制近似比的上界与下界。