This paper examines the problem of distributing rewards on social networks to improve the efficiency of crowdsourcing tasks for sponsors. To complete the tasks efficiently, we aim to design reward mechanisms that incentivize early-joining agents to invite more participants to the tasks. Nonetheless, participants could potentially engage in strategic behaviors, e.g., not inviting others to the tasks, misreporting their capacity for the tasks, or creaking fake identities (aka Sybil attacks), to maximize their own rewards. The focus of this study is to address the challenge outlined above by designing effective reward mechanisms. To this end, we propose a novel reward mechanism, called Propagation Reward Distribution Mechanism (PRDM), for the general information propagation model with limited budgets. It is proved that the PRDM can not only incentivize all agents to contribute their full efforts to the tasks and share the task information to all their neighbors in the social networks, but can also prevent them from Sybil attacks.

翻译：本文研究了在社交网络中分配奖励以提高赞助商众包任务效率的问题。为高效完成任务，我们旨在设计激励早期加入的代理邀请更多参与者加入任务的奖励机制。然而，参与者可能采取策略性行为——例如不邀请他人参与任务、虚报自身任务能力或创建虚假身份（即女巫攻击）——以最大化自身收益。本研究的重点是通过设计有效的奖励机制应对上述挑战。为此，我们针对有限预算下的通用信息传播模型，提出了一种名为传播奖励分配机制的新型奖励机制。研究证明，该机制不仅能激励所有代理为任务全力以赴并将其社交网络中的所有邻居分享任务信息，还能有效防范女巫攻击。