This paper considers exchange of indivisible objects when agents are endowed with and desire bundles of objects. Agents are assumed to have lexicographic preferences over bundles. We show that the generalized Top Trading Cycles rule (TTC) is characterized by Pareto efficiency, balancedness, the weak endowment lower bound, and truncation-proofness (or drop strategy-proofness). In the classic Shapley-Scarf model, TTC is characterized by Pareto efficiency, individual rationality, and truncation-proofness. The proof is nonstandard and its novelty has independent methodological interest.

翻译：本文考虑当代理人被赋予并期望获得物品束时的不可分割物品交换问题。假设代理人对物品束具有字典序偏好。我们证明广义顶交易循环规则（TTC）可由帕累托效率、平衡性、弱禀赋下界性以及截断抗性（或舍弃策略抗性）所刻画。在经典Shapley-Scarf模型中，TTC可由帕累托效率、个体理性与截断抗性所刻画。该证明采用非标准方法，其新颖性具有独立的方法论意义。