This paper considers exchange of indivisible objects when agents are endowed with and can consume any bundles. We focus on efficient allocation rules that satisfy a novel participation requirement, the weak endowment lower bound, and which defend against simple manipulation heuristics: drop strategies and truncation strategies. Based on these properties, we obtain characterizations of a generalized version of Top Trading Cycles (TTC) on several domains. On the lexicographic and conditionally lexicographic domains, TTC is characterized by Pareto efficiency, balancedness, the weak endowment lower bound, and truncation-proofness (or drop strategy-proofness). On the domain of responsive preferences, similar characterizations are obtained by restricting attention to rules that are ``individual-good-based'' and weakening Pareto efficiency to individual-good efficiency. For the Shapley-Scarf model, TTC is characterized by Pareto efficiency, individual rationality, and truncation-proofness. The lexicographic and conditionally lexicographic domains are maximal domains on which Pareto efficiency coincides with individual-good efficiency.

翻译：本文研究当代理人被赋予且可消费任意物品束时不可分物品的交换问题。我们聚焦于满足新型参与要求（即弱禀赋下界）并能抵御简单操纵启发式（放弃策略与截断策略）的有效分配规则。基于这些性质，我们在多个定义域上获得了广义版"顶级交易环"（TTC）的特征刻画。在词典序与条件词典序定义域上，TTC由帕累托效率、平衡性、弱禀赋下界及截断策略防护性（或放弃策略防护性）共同刻画。在响应性偏好定义域上，通过将规则限定为"基于单个物品"的规则并将帕累托效率弱化为单个物品效率，我们获得了类似的特征刻画。对于Shapley-Scarf模型，TTC由帕累托效率、个体理性与截断策略防护性共同刻画。词典序与条件词典序定义域是帕累托效率与单个物品效率相重合的最大定义域。