Privacy-sensitive edge services necessitate optimizing diverse-type resource scheduling to support trustworthy provisioning within a zero-trust security framework. However, existing studies rarely model how runtime compliance jointly affects bilateral clearing, ex-post settlement, and future seller eligibility in dynamic edge markets. To address this issue, we propose ZEBRIS, a zero-trust bilateral edge service trading framework with deposit-refund regulation for privacy-sensitive services. Specifically, edge provisioning is modeled as a trading form of zero-trust-compliant service packages, where the buyer-side effective valuation captures service value, delay penalty, and privacy risk, while the seller-side effective ask incorporates resource and compliance costs. This yields a resource-aware positive-margin bilateral clearing mechanism under shared resource and security constraints. To discipline post-clearing moral hazard, we further design a capped deposit-refund settlement rule based on measurable runtime compliance and update each seller's future security posture according to realized compliance outcomes. ZEBRIS satisfies bilateral individual rationality and no-subsidy weak budget balance. Experiments demonstrate that ZEBRIS improves social welfare and compliance robustness while reducing service delay and privacy-risk-weighted cost over representative baselines.

翻译：隐私敏感的边缘服务需要优化多样化资源调度，以在零信任安全框架下支持可信服务提供。然而，现有研究鲜有建模运行时合规性如何共同影响动态边缘市场中的双边清算、事后结算及卖方未来资格。针对此问题，我们提出ZEBRIS——一种针对隐私敏感服务的零信任双边边缘服务交易框架，并采用存款返还机制进行监管。具体而言，边缘服务提供被建模为符合零信任要求的服务包交易形式，其中买方有效估值包含服务价值、延迟惩罚和隐私风险，而卖方有效报价则包含资源和合规成本。由此在共享资源和安全约束下产生了资源感知的正利润双边清算机制。为约束清算后的道德风险，我们进一步设计了一种基于可测运行时合规性的带上限存款返还结算规则，并根据实际合规结果更新每个卖方的未来安全状态。ZEBRIS满足双边个体理性及无补贴弱预算平衡。实验表明，相比代表性基线方法，ZEBRIS在降低服务延迟和隐私风险加权成本的同时，提高了社会福利和合规稳健性。