Decentralized protocols claim immutable, rule-based execution, yet many embed emergency mechanisms such as chain-level freezes, protocol pauses, and account quarantines. These overrides are crucial for responding to exploits and systemic failures, but they expose a core tension: when does intervention preserve trust and when is it perceived as illegitimate discretion? With approximately \$10 billion in technical exploit losses potentially addressable by onchain intervention (2016-2026), the design of these mechanisms has high practical stakes, but current approaches remain ad hoc and ideologically charged. We address this gap by developing a Scope $\times$ Authority taxonomy that maps the design space of emergency architectures along two dimensions: the precision of the intervention and the concentration of trigger authority. We formalize the resulting tradeoffs of standing centralization cost, containment speed, and collateral disruption as a stochastic decision support framework, and derive three empirical hypotheses from it. Assessing the framework against 705 documented exploit incidents, we find that containment time varies systematically by authority type, that losses follow a heavy-tailed distribution ($α\approx 1.33$) concentrating risk in rare catastrophic events, and that community sentiment plausibly modulates the effective cost of maintaining intervention capability. Using scope breadth as a practical proxy for blast potential, we also find that narrower interventions (Account/Module) do not underperform broader ones (Protocol/Network) on containment success and are slightly faster at the median, giving partial empirical support to the scope-blast hypothesis. The analysis yields design guidance for emergency governance and reframes the problem as one of engineering tradeoffs rather than ideological debate.

翻译：去中心化协议宣称具有基于规则的不可变执行特性，然而许多协议内嵌了链级冻结、协议暂停和账户隔离等应急机制。这些覆盖机制对于应对漏洞利用和系统性故障至关重要，但也暴露了一个核心矛盾：干预何时能维系信任，何时会被视为非法裁量？在2016至2026年间，约100亿美元的技术漏洞损失本可通过链上干预加以避免，这些机制的设计具有极高的实践利害关系，但当前的方法仍停留在临时拼凑且充满意识形态争论的阶段。为解决这一空白，我们提出了一个“范围×权限”分类体系，从干预精确度与触发权限集中度两个维度描绘应急架构的设计空间。我们将由此产生的“持续中心化成本、遏制速度与附带破坏”之间的权衡形式化为一个随机决策支持框架，并从中推导出三个经验假设。通过对705起有记录的漏洞事件进行框架评估，我们发现遏制时间随权限类型呈现系统性差异，损失服从重尾分布（α≈1.33），风险集中于罕见的灾难性事件，且社区情绪可能调节维持干预能力的有效成本。进一步，利用作用范围宽度作为爆炸潜力的实用代理指标，我们发现窄干预（账户/模块）在遏制成功率上并不逊于宽干预（协议/网络），且中位数速度略快，这为“范围-爆炸”假设提供了部分实证支持。该分析为应急治理提供了设计指导，并将问题重新定义为工程权衡而非意识形态辩论。