Limited Voting (LV) is an approval-based method for multi-winner elections where all ballots are required to have a same fixed size. While it appears to be used as voting method in corporate governance and has some political applications, to the best of our knowledge, no formal analysis of the rule exists to date. We provide such an analysis here, prompted by a request for advice about this voting rule by a health insurance company in the Netherlands, which uses it to elect its work council. We study conditions under which LV would improve representation over standard approval voting and when it would not. We establish the extent of such an improvement, or lack thereof, both in terms of diversity and proportionality notions. These results help us understand if, and how, LV may be used as a low-effort fix of approval voting in order to enhance representation.

翻译：有限投票制是一种基于赞成票的多席位选举方法，要求所有选票具有相同的固定规模。尽管该方法在公司治理中作为投票机制被使用，并具有某些政治应用场景，但据我们所知，目前尚不存在对该规则的正式分析。本文受荷兰一家健康保险公司之邀（该公司采用此规则选举其员工委员会）而展开相关分析。我们研究了有限投票制在何种条件下能比标准赞成投票制提升代表性，在何种条件下无法提升。我们从多样性与比例代表性两个维度，量化分析了这种改进（或缺失）的程度。这些结果有助于我们理解有限投票制是否以及如何能作为赞成投票制的低复杂度修正方案，以增强代表性。