Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) requires Network Operators (NOs) to undertake substantial infrastructure investments, while most revenues are captured by Service Providers (SPs) offering end-user applications. This cost-revenue imbalance discourages NOs from investing in MEC deployment, despite increasing demand for low-latency and bandwidth-intensive services. This paper proposes a co-investment scheme in which players, i.e., one NO and multiple SPs, jointly deploy, maintain, and share MEC infrastructure over multiple decision epochs. We devise a new coalitional game model that captures the planning of resources, their allocation among players, and cost and revenue sharing. To address fluctuating user demand and evolving participation incentives, we design a mechanism that updates resources and allows the dynamic entrance and exit of players over time. We sustain cooperation through a compensation scheme. Numerical results show that combining resource updates with dynamic participation increases the total payoff and strengthens the NO's incentive to invest.

翻译：移动边缘计算（MEC）需要网络运营商（NO）承担大规模基础设施投资，而大部分收益却被提供终端应用的服务提供商（SP）获得。这种成本与收益的失衡导致网络运营商在低延迟和高带宽服务需求持续增长的背景下，对部署移动边缘计算缺乏投资意愿。本文提出一种联合投资方案，其中参与者（即一家网络运营商与多家服务提供商）在多个决策周期内共同部署、维护和共享MEC基础设施。我们设计了一种新型联盟博弈模型，该模型涵盖资源规划、参与者间的资源分配以及成本与收益分摊机制。为应对波动的用户需求与动态变化的参与激励，我们构建了支持资源动态更新与参与者实时进出机制的方案，并通过补偿机制维持合作。数值结果表明，资源更新与动态参与的协同作用能有效提升总收益，同时增强网络运营商的投资积极性。