Process attestation systems verify that a continuous physical process, such as human authorship, actually occurred, rather than merely checking system state. These systems face a fundamental dependability challenge: the evidence collection infrastructure must remain available and tamper-resistant even when the attesting party controls the platform. Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) provide hardware-enforced isolation that can address this challenge, but their integration with continuous process attestation introduces novel resilience requirements not addressed by existing frameworks. We present the first architecture for continuous process attestation evidence collection inside TEEs, providing hardware-backed tamper resistance against trust-inverted adversaries with graduated input assurance from software-channel integrity (Tier 1) through hardware-bound input (Tier 3). We develop a Markov-chain dependability model quantifying Evidence Chain Availability (ECA), Mean Time Between Evidence Gaps (MTBEG), and Recovery Time Objectives (RTO). We introduce a resilient evidence chain protocol maintaining chain integrity across TEE crashes, network partitions, and enclave migration. Our security analysis derives formal bounds under combined threat models including trust inversion and TEE side channels, parameterized by a conjectural side-channel leakage bound esc that requires empirical validation. Evaluation on Intel SGX demonstrates under 25% per-checkpoint CPU overhead (<0.3% of the 30 s checkpoint interval), >99.5% Evidence Chain Availability (ECA) (the fraction of session time with active evidence collection) in Monte Carlo simulation under Poisson failure models, and sealed-state recovery under 200 ms.

翻译：过程证明系统验证连续物理过程（如人类作者身份）确实发生，而不仅仅是检查系统状态。这些系统面临一个基本的可靠性挑战：即使证明方控制着平台，证据收集基础设施也必须保持可用且防篡改。可信执行环境（TEE）提供了硬件强化的隔离能力，可应对这一挑战，但将其与连续过程证明集成引入了现有框架未涉及的新型弹性需求。我们提出了首个在TEE内部进行连续过程证明证据收集的架构，通过从软件通道完整性（第1级）到硬件绑定输入（第3级）的渐进式输入保障，提供针对信任逆序攻击者的硬件支持防篡改能力。我们开发了量化证据链可用性（ECA）、平均证据间隙时间（MTBEG）和恢复时间目标（RTO）的马尔可夫链可靠性模型。我们引入了一种弹性证据链协议，可在TEE崩溃、网络分区和飞地迁移情况下保持链完整性。我们的安全分析在组合威胁模型（包括信任逆序和TEE侧信道）下推导出形式化界限，该界限由需要经验验证的推测性侧信道泄漏界限esc参数化。在Intel SGX上的评估表明：每个检查点CPU开销低于25%（占30秒检查点间隔的<0.3%），在泊松故障模型下的蒙特卡洛模拟中证据链可用性（ECA）>99.5%（会话时间内活跃证据收集的占比），并在200毫秒内实现密封状态恢复。