Process attestation systems verify that a continuous physical process, such as human authorship, actually occurred, rather than merely checking system state. These systems face a fundamental dependability challenge: the evidence collection infrastructure must remain available and tamper-resistant even when the attesting party controls the platform. Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) provide hardware-enforced isolation that can address this challenge, but their integration with continuous process attestation introduces novel resilience requirements not addressed by existing frameworks. We present the first architecture for continuous process attestation evidence collection inside TEEs, providing hardware-backed tamper resistance against trust-inverted adversaries with graduated input assurance from software-channel integrity (Tier 1) through hardware-bound input (Tier 3). We develop a Markov-chain dependability model quantifying Evidence Chain Availability (ECA), Mean Time Between Evidence Gaps (MTBEG), and Recovery Time Objectives (RTO). We introduce a resilient evidence chain protocol maintaining chain integrity across TEE crashes, network partitions, and enclave migration. Our security analysis derives formal bounds under combined threat models including trust inversion and TEE side channels, parameterized by a conjectural side-channel leakage bound esc that requires empirical validation. Evaluation on Intel SGX demonstrates under 25% per-checkpoint CPU overhead (<0.3% of the 30 s checkpoint interval), >99.5% Evidence Chain Availability (ECA) (the fraction of session time with active evidence collection) in Monte Carlo simulation under Poisson failure models, and sealed-state recovery under 200 ms.

翻译：流程认证系统用于验证连续物理过程（如人类作者身份）是否真实发生，而非仅仅检查系统状态。这些系统面临一个根本性的可靠性挑战：即使认证方控制平台，证据收集基础设施也必须保持可用且防篡改。可信执行环境（TEEs）提供的硬件强制隔离可以应对这一挑战，但其与连续流程认证的集成引入了现有框架未解决的新弹性要求。我们提出了首个在TEE内部进行连续流程认证证据收集的架构，通过从软件通道完整性（第1级）到硬件绑定输入（第3级）的分级输入保证，提供硬件支持的防篡改能力以应对信任反转攻击者。我们开发了一个马尔可夫链可靠性模型，量化证据链可用性（ECA）、证据间隙平均时间（MTBEG）和恢复时间目标（RTO）。我们引入了一种弹性证据链协议，可在TEE崩溃、网络分区和飞地迁移期间保持链完整性。我们的安全分析在包括信任反转和TEE侧信道的组合威胁模型下推导出形式化边界，并通过一个需要实证验证的推测性侧信道泄漏边界参数esc进行参数化。在Intel SGX上的评估表明：每个检查点的CPU开销低于25%（占30秒检查点间隔的<0.3%），在泊松故障模型的蒙特卡洛模拟中证据链可用性（ECA）>99.5%（即会话中有效证据收集时间的比例），且密封状态恢复时间低于200毫秒。