We consider a class of pursuit-evasion differential games in which the evader has continuous access to the pursuer's location, but not vice-versa. There is a remote sensor (e.g., a radar station) that can sense the evader's location upon a request from the pursuer and communicate that sensed location to the pursuer. The pursuer has a budget on the total number of sensing requests. The outcome of the game is determined by the sensing and motion strategies of the players. We obtain an equilibrium sensing strategy for the pursuer and an equilibrium motion strategy for the evader. We quantify the degradation in the pursuer's pay-off due to its sensing limitations.

翻译：我们考虑一类追逃微分博弈，其中逃逸者能够持续获取追踪者的位置信息，而追踪者则无法反向获取逃逸者的位置。存在一个远程传感器（例如雷达站），在收到追踪者的请求后可感知逃逸者的位置，并将该位置信息传送给追踪者。追踪者拥有总感知请求次数的预算限制。博弈结果由双方的感知策略与运动策略共同决定。我们推导出追踪者在均衡状态下的感知策略，以及逃逸者在均衡状态下的运动策略，并量化了因感知限制导致的追踪者收益损失。