We study efficient mechanism design for allocating multiple heterogeneous objects. The aim is to maximize the residual surplus, the total value generated from an allocation minus the costs of screening. We discover a robust trend indicating that no-screening mechanisms, such as serial dictatorship with exogenous priority order, tend to perform better as the variety of goods increases. We analyze the underlying reasons by characterizing asymptotically efficient mechanisms in a stylized environment. We also apply an automated mechanism design approach to numerically derive efficient mechanisms and validate the trend in general environments. Building on these implications, we propose the register-invite-book system (RIB) as an efficient system for scheduling vaccinations against pandemic diseases.

翻译：本研究探讨多类异质物品分配中的高效机制设计问题，目标在于最大化剩余盈余——即分配产生的总价值减去筛选成本。我们发现一个稳健趋势：随着物品种类的增加，无筛选机制（如采用外生优先级排序的序列独裁机制）往往表现出更优性能。通过在一个典型化环境中刻画渐近有效机制的特征，我们深入分析了这一现象的内在机理。同时，我们运用自动化机制设计方法，通过数值计算推导高效机制，并在一般化环境中验证了该趋势的普适性。基于这些发现，我们提出注册-邀请-预约系统（RIB），作为大流行病疫苗接种调度的高效实施方案。