We study a many-to-one matching model inspired by school choice, where schools evaluate applicants using multiple rankings rather than a single priority order. We model each school's evaluation with social choice criteria to reflect the school's internal ranking process. In particular, we define acceptable choices as candidates ranked above a top percentile of the accepted cohort by a sufficient number of evaluators. Stability is then defined in terms of acceptability: accepted candidates must receive strong support, while rejected candidates receive at most weak support. Since exact acceptability and stability may not exist, we construct approximately stable outcomes using a new equilibrium concept that combines matching with a Lindahl equilibrium over ordinal preferences, providing a flexible, equilibrium-based framework for committee-based matching markets.

翻译：我们研究一个受学校选择启发的多对一匹配模型，其中学校使用多个排序而非单一优先级顺序来评估申请者。我们通过社会选择准则对每个学校的评估过程进行建模，以反映学校内部的排序机制。具体而言，我们将可接受的选择定义为：在足够多评估者的排序中，位于被录取群体前某个百分位数之上的候选人。随后，稳定性依据可接受性进行定义：被录取的候选人必须获得强有力的支持，而被拒绝的候选人至多获得微弱的支持。由于精确的可接受性与稳定性可能不存在，我们通过一个新的均衡概念构建近似稳定的结果，该概念将匹配与基于序数偏好的林达尔均衡相结合，为基于委员会的匹配市场提供了一个灵活且基于均衡的框架。