In this article, we propose a new form of DAO governance that uses a sequential auction mechanism to overcome entrenched control issues that have emerged for DAOs by creating a regime of temporary contestable control. The mechanism avoids potential public choice problems inherent in voting approaches but at the same time provides a vehicle that can enhance and secure value than inheres to DAO voting and other DAO non-market governance procedures. It is robust to empty voting and is code feasible. It facilitates the ability of DAOs to meet their normative and operational goals in the face of diverse regulatory approaches. Designed to shift control to the party with the most promising business plan, at the same time it distributes surplus in a way that tends to promote investment by other parties.

翻译：本文提出了一种新型DAO治理机制，该机制采用序贯拍卖方法，通过建立临时性可竞争控制制度，以解决去中心化自治组织（DAO）中已出现的固化控制问题。该机制避免了投票方式固有的公共选择问题，同时为增强并保障DAO投票及其他非市场治理程序中的内在价值提供了载体。该机制对空投投票具有稳健性，且具备代码可行性。在应对多样化监管路径时，该机制有助于DAO实现其规范与运营目标。其设计旨在将控制权转移至商业计划最具前景的参与方，同时以促进其他方投资为导向进行盈余分配。