In this paper we introduce and analyse, from a game theoretical perspective, several multi-agent or multi-item continuous review inventory models in which the buyers are exempted from ordering costs if the price of their orders is greater than or equal to a certain amount. For all models we obtain the optimal ordering policy. We first analyse a simple model with one firm and one item. Then, we study a model with one firm and several items, for which we design a procedure based on cooperative game theory to evaluate the impact of each item on the total cost. Then, we deal with a model with several firms and one item for each firm, for which we characterise a rule to allocate the total cost among the firms in a coalitionally stable way. Finally, we discuss a model with several firms and several items, for which we characterise a rule to allocate the total cost among the firms in a coalitionally stable way and to evaluate the impact of each item on the cost that would be payable to each firm when using the allocation rule. All the concepts and results of this article are illustrated using data from a case study.

翻译：本文从博弈论视角出发，引入并分析了多种多智能体或多品目连续盘点库存模型，其中若订单价格达到或超过某一阈值，买方即可免于支付订购成本。针对所有模型，我们获得了最优订购策略。首先分析单一企业单一品目的简单模型，继而研究单一企业多品目模型，并基于合作博弈理论设计了一种评估各品目对总成本影响的规程。随后，我们探讨了多企业各持单品目模型，刻画了一种能实现联盟稳定性的企业间总成本分配规则。最后，我们讨论了多企业多品目模型，该模型不仅刻画了联盟稳定性的成本分配规则，还评估了采用该分配规则时各品目对每家企业应付成本的影响。文中所有概念与结论均通过案例研究数据加以阐释。