We introduce a model of probabilistic verification in mechanism design. The principal elicits a message from the agent and then selects a test to give the agent. The agent's true type determines the probability with which he can pass each test. We characterize whether each type has an associated test that best screens out all other types. If this condition holds, then the testing technology can be represented in a tractable reduced form. We use this reduced form to solve for profit-maximizing mechanisms with verification. As the verification technology varies, the solution continuously interpolates between the no-verification solution and full surplus extraction.

翻译：本文提出了机制设计中的概率验证模型。委托人从代理人处获取信息，随后选择一项测试对代理人进行检验。代理人的真实类型决定其通过每项测试的概率。我们刻画了每种类型是否存在一种能够最优筛选出所有其他类型的对应测试。若该条件成立，则验证技术可通过一种易处理的简化形式表示。利用这种简化形式，我们求解了带验证的利润最大化机制。随着验证技术的变化，该解在无验证解与完全剩余提取之间连续插值。