Agentic systems now act with user secrets for APIs, messaging platforms, and cloud services. Today's agent runtimes typically implement authorization by exposure: enabling action means placing a reusable secret, or a reusable artifact derived from it, inside the runtime, so a transient prompt-injection or tool-side compromise becomes durable account compromise. Existing defenses cover adjacent pieces such as secret storage, scoped delegation, sender-constrained tokens, and runtime monitoring, but none states the combined requirement: an untrusted autonomous requester should be able to cause a user-authorized secret-backed operation without gaining reusable authority over it. We formalize this as the Agent Secret Use (ASU) problem and identify seven security properties any solution must satisfy, spanning authorization integrity and secret confidentiality. We propose the Secret-Use Delegation Protocol (SUDP), in which a requester proposes a canonical operation, the user authorizes it with a fresh authenticator-backed grant, and a custodian redeems the grant to perform the bounded use; reusable authority never crosses the requester boundary. We specialize SUDP for LLM-driven agents, where it applies whenever a tool call would exercise user-enrolled authority-bearing material. Under standard cryptographic assumptions, SUDP satisfies six of the seven properties; the seventh, runtime-memory confidentiality, is closed by composition with a hardware-rooted runtime. A reference implementation, available at https://github.com/xhyumiracle/sudp, adds sub-millisecond protocol overhead per mediated call.

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