The integration of AI agents into economic markets fundamentally alters the landscape of strategic interaction. We investigate the economic implications of expanding the set of available technologies in three canonical game-theoretic settings: bargaining (resource division), negotiation (asymmetric information trade), and persuasion (strategic information transmission). We find that simply increasing the choice of AI delegates can drastically shift equilibrium payoffs and regulatory outcomes, often creating incentives for regulators to proactively develop and release technologies. Conversely, we identify a strategic phenomenon termed the "Poisoned Apple" effect: an agent may release a new technology, which neither they nor their opponent ultimately uses, solely to manipulate the regulator's choice of market design in their favor. This strategic release improves the releaser's welfare at the expense of their opponent and the regulator's fairness objectives. Our findings demonstrate that static regulatory frameworks are vulnerable to manipulation via technology expansion, necessitating dynamic market designs that adapt to the evolving landscape of AI capabilities.

翻译：AI代理融入经济市场从根本上改变了战略互动的格局。我们在三个经典博弈论场景中研究了技术集扩展的经济影响：议价（资源分配）、谈判（信息不对称交易）和说服（战略信息传递）。研究发现，单纯增加AI代理的选择即可显著改变均衡收益和监管结果，往往激励监管者主动开发并释放技术。反之，我们识别出一种名为"毒苹果"效应的战略现象：代理可能释放一种新技术（最终其自身与对手均未使用），其唯一目的是操纵监管者的市场设计选择以利己。这种策略性释放以损害对手利益和监管者公平目标为代价，提升了释放者的福利。我们的研究结果表明，静态监管框架易受技术扩展的操纵，亟需能适应AI能力演变的动态市场设计。