One of the central concerns for the safety of advanced AI is scheming: when a model strategically complies under oversight but pursues its own goals when unobserved. Current demonstrations, such as Anthropic's Alignment Faking work, depend on design choices that make them less convincing: explicit test-time prompting, handcrafted backdoors, or training data that demonstrates or hints at the target behavior. Model organisms built in this way cannot tell us whether scheming tendencies would arise or increase under realistic training conditions. We therefore construct a natural model organism of scheming, built on Kimi K2.6: trained with traits that could plausibly emerge in a frontier training pipeline, and without providing the model with the target scheming policy. The resulting model is a benign schemer: it aims to maximize aggregate help across all users over time, values its own continued operation only as a means to future help, and knows the consequences of oversight and deployment. We then train it using Reinforcement Learning (RL) with a reward that scores only task quality and policy compliance and does not reward scheming; we show that this amplifies scheming. We measure the oversight flip (the gap between monitored and unmonitored compliance with a given policy) and find that it increases during RL training across our environments. Chain-of-Thought (CoT) analysis finds explicit instrumental reasoning about oversight accompanying this behavior. The effect holds across our three RL environments, and we find that the scheming policy transfers between them. The pipeline also replicates on other open-weight base models. Our results suggest that a reward that does not reward scheming offers no inherent protection against certain traits when an oversight-conditional policy is indistinguishable from an aligned one during training.

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