Evolutionary game theory assumes that individuals maximize their benefits when choosing strategies. However, an alternative perspective proposes that individuals seek to maximize the benefits of others. To explore the relationship between these perspectives, we develop a model where self- and other-regarding preferences compete in public goods games. We find that other-regarding preferences are more effective in promoting cooperation, even when self-regarding preferences are more productive. Cooperators with different preferences can coexist in a new phase where two classic solutions invade each other, resulting in a dynamical equilibrium. As a consequence, a lower productivity of self-regarding cooperation can provide a higher cooperation level. Our results, which are also valid in a well-mixed population, may explain why other-regarding preferences could be a viable and frequently observed attitude in human society.

翻译：演化博弈理论假设个体在选择策略时最大化自身利益。然而，另一种观点认为个体追求最大化他人利益。为探究这两种观点之间的关系，我们构建了一个模型，其中自我偏好与他者偏好在公共物品博弈中相互竞争。研究发现，即使自我偏好更具生产力，他者偏好促进合作的效率更高。具有不同偏好的合作者能够在一种新阶段中共存——两种经典解决方案相互入侵，形成动态均衡。因此，自我合作生产力的降低反而可能提高整体合作水平。我们的结果在均匀混合群体中同样成立，这或许解释了为何他者偏好是人类社会中一种可行且普遍存在的态度。