Prior work has studied the computational complexity of computing optimal strategies to commit to in Stackelberg or leadership games, where a leader commits to a strategy which is observed by one or more followers. We extend this setting to one where the leader can additionally commit to outcome-conditional utility transfers. We characterize the computational complexity of finding optimal strategies in normal-form and Bayesian games, giving a mix of efficient algorithms and NP-hardness results. Finally, we allow the leader to also commit to a signaling scheme which induces a correlated equilibrium. In this setting, optimal commitments can be found in polynomial time for arbitrarily many players.

翻译：先前的研究已经探讨了在Stackelberg博弈或领导博弈中计算最优承诺策略的计算复杂性，其中领导者承诺一个可被一个或多个跟随者观察到的策略。我们将此设定扩展至允许领导者额外承诺结果条件效用转移的情形。我们刻画了在标准形式博弈与贝叶斯博弈中寻找最优策略的计算复杂性，给出了高效算法与NP困难结果的混合结论。最后，我们允许领导者同时承诺一个诱导相关均衡的信令方案。在此设定下，对于任意数量的参与者，最优承诺可在多项式时间内求解。