We investigate a coordination model for a two-stage collective decision-making problem within the framework of global games. The agents observe noisy signals of a shared random variable, referred to as the fundamental, which determines the underlying payoff. Based on these signals, the agents decide whether to participate in a collective action now or to delay. An agent who delays acquires additional information by observing the identities of agents who have chosen to participate in the first stage. This informational advantage, however, comes at the cost of a discounted payoff if coordination ultimately succeeds. Within this decision-making framework, we analyze how the option to delay can enhance collective outcomes. We show that this intertemporal trade-off between information acquisition and payoff reduction can improve coordination and increase the efficiency of collective decision-making.

翻译：我们研究了全球博弈框架下两阶段集体决策问题中的协调模型。代理人观测到一个共享随机变量（称为基本面）的含噪信号，该变量决定基础收益。基于这些信号，代理人决定是立即参与集体行动还是延迟行动。延迟行动的代理人通过观察第一阶段选择参与的代理人身份来获取额外信息。然而，这种信息优势以协调最终成功时收益折现为代价。在这一决策框架内，我们分析了延迟选项如何提升集体结果。研究表明，信息获取与收益减少之间的跨期权衡能够改善协调，并提高集体决策的效率。