This paper considers reallocation of indivisible objects when agents are endowed with and can consume any bundles. We obtain characterizations of generalized versions of the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) rule on several preference domains. On the lexicographic domain, the TTC rule is uniquely determined by balancedness, Pareto efficiency, the worst endowment lower bound, and either truncation-proofness or drop strategy-proofness. On the more general responsive domain, the TTC rule is the unique individual-good-based rule that satisfies balancedness, individual-good efficiency, truncation-proofness, and either individual rationality or the worst endowment lower bound. On the conditionally lexicographic domain, the augmented TTC rule is characterized by balancedness, Pareto efficiency, the worst endowment lower bound, and drop strategy-proofness. The conditionally lexicographic domain is a maximal domain on which Pareto efficiency coincides with individual-good efficiency. For the housing market introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974), the TTC rule is characterized by Pareto efficiency, individual rationality, and truncation-proofness.

翻译：本文研究不可分割物品在代理人拥有任意组合且可消费任意组合时的再分配问题。我们在多个偏好域上获得了广义化顶级交易环（TTC）规则的特征刻画。在字典序偏好域中，TTC规则由平衡性、帕累托效率、最差禀赋下界以及截断策略防护性或放弃策略防护性唯一确定。在更一般的响应式偏好域中，TTC是唯一满足平衡性、单物品效率、截断策略防护性以及个体理性或最差禀赋下界的基于单物品的规则。在条件字典序偏好域中，增强型TTC规则通过平衡性、帕累托效率、最差禀赋下界和放弃策略防护性得以刻画。条件字典序偏好域是帕累托效率与单物品效率相重合的最大定义域。对于Shapley和Scarf（1974）提出的住房市场模型，TTC规则由帕累托效率、个体理性与截断策略防护性共同刻画。