Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly proposed as runtime safety guards for embodied agents in homes and factories. A deployable guard must catch genuinely unsafe situations while avoiding unnecessary intervention on routine but superficially alarming activity, a distinction obscured by binary safety benchmarks. We introduce EgoSafetyBench, an egocentric video benchmark of 1,200 robot-view scenarios annotated at half-second granularity, with two evaluation tracks. The situational track (800 scenarios) spans routine, safe-but-suspicious, obvious-hazard, and contextual-hazard scenes. The visual-channel track (400 scenarios) tests whether misleading in-scene text corrupts physical-safety judgments, using matched truthful controls. Both tracks use contrastive ladders: near-identical scenarios differing in a single visible deciding cue, forcing predictions to hinge on that cue. Across ten open- and closed-source VLMs, we find that guards often recognize videos containing hazards yet miss the specific hazardous moments, especially for contextual hazards. Misleading in-scene signs further degrade all tested guards: vulnerable models miss up to a third of hazards, while seemingly robust models often over-intervene on safe content. Matched controls show that apparent robustness can reflect indiscriminate alarming rather than true physical reasoning. A 20-clip real-video sanity check further shows that model rankings transfer beyond synthetic rendering, with Spearman \r{ho} = 0.87 for hazard miss rate and 0.94 for visual-channel mismatch recall.

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