Autonomous vehicles (AVs) rely on the Global Positioning System (GPS) or Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) for precise (Positioning, Navigation, and Timing) PNT solutions. However, the vulnerability of GPS signals to intentional and unintended threats due to their lack of encryption and weak signal strength poses serious risks, thereby reducing the reliability of AVs. GPS spoofing is a complex and damaging attack that deceives AVs by altering GPS receivers to calculate false position and tracking information leading to misdirection. This study explores a stealthy slow drift GPS spoofing attack, replicating the victim AV's satellite reception pattern while changing pseudo ranges to deceive the AV, particularly during turns. The attack is designed to gradually deviate from the correct route, making real-time detection challenging and jeopardizing user safety. We present a system and study methodology for constructing covert spoofing attacks on AVs, investigating the correlation between original and spoofed pseudo ranges to create effective defenses. By closely following the victim vehicle and using the same satellite signals, the attacker executes the attack precisely. Changing the pseudo ranges confuses the AV, leading it to incorrect destinations while remaining oblivious to the manipulation. The gradual deviation from the actual route further conceals the attack, hindering its swift identification. The experiments showcase a robust correlation between the original and spoofed pseudo ranges, with R square values varying between 0.99 and 1. This strong correlation facilitates effective evaluation and mitigation of spoofing signals.

翻译：自动驾驶车辆（AVs）依赖全球定位系统（GPS）或全球导航卫星系统（GNSS）提供精确的定位、导航与授时（PNT）解决方案。然而，GPS信号因缺乏加密且信号强度较弱，易受有意与无意威胁的影响，这严重削弱了AVs的可靠性。GPS欺骗是一种复杂且破坏性强的攻击手段，通过篡改GPS接收器使其计算错误的定位与跟踪信息，进而误导AVs。本研究探索了一种隐蔽的慢漂移GPS欺骗攻击：复制目标AV的卫星接收模式，同时改变伪距以欺骗AV（尤其在转弯时）。该攻击旨在逐步偏离正确路径，使得实时检测极具挑战性，从而危及用户安全。我们提出了一套系统及研究方法，用于构建针对AVs的隐蔽欺骗攻击，通过分析原始伪距与欺骗伪距之间的相关性，为有效防御奠定基础。攻击者通过紧贴目标车辆并利用相同卫星信号，精确实施攻击。改变伪距会使AV迷惑，致使其在完全未察觉操控的情况下驶向错误目的地。攻击路径逐步偏离实际路线，进一步掩盖攻击行为，阻碍快速识别。实验表明，原始伪距与欺骗伪距之间存在强相关性，R平方值介于0.99至1之间。这一强相关性有助于有效评估与缓解欺骗信号。